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THE BENCH AND THE BALLOT: APPLYING THE




The report of the Florida Supreme Court Racial and Ethnic Bias
Study Commission documents an exhaustive examination of the
effects of racial and ethnic bias on the administration of justice in
Florida.' One dominant theme of the study is the importance of diver-
sity on the bench and at all levels of the judicial system. As the Study
Commission concluded, "[t]he State simply cannot expect continued
acceptance of a judicial system in which minorities are virtually invisi-
ble in positions of decision-making and responsibility." '2
The Study Commission's findings coincide with major develop-
ments in litigation challenging at-large judicial election systems under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 3 Reversing a 12-1 en banc
decision of the Fifth Circuit,4 the United States Supreme Court ruled
last term in two companion cases that state election schemes for
judges are covered by the requirements of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act.5 Black voters may therefore seek relief under Section 2
* Attorney, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; B.A., 1979, Bryn Mawr
College; J.D., 1982, Yale Law School.
The author is co-counsel for minority plaintiffs in two judicial election lawsuits in Florida.
The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of
the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. The author thanks Frank Parker, Robert
McDuff, and James Halpert for their comments and suggestions.
1. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF ThE FLORIDA SUPREME CouRT RACIAL AND ETNc
BIAs STUDY Com.4ssIoN (1991), reprinted in 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 591 (1992) (reprinted with
permission) [hereinafter SrvDy CoMMussioN].
2. Id. at611-12.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
4. League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th
Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376
(1991).
5. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991); Chisom v. Roemer,
111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991). Additionally, the Supreme Court confirmed that Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, which contains similar language, also applies to the election of judges. Clark v.
Roemer, Ill S. Ct. 2096 (1991). See also Haith v. Martin, 618 F. Supp. 410 (E.D.N.C. 1985),
aff'd, 477 U.S. 901 (1986) (mem.).
670 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 19:669
against at-large judicial election systems that deny them an equal op-
portunity to elect candidates of their choice to office.
Lawsuits targeting judicial elections are an outgrowth of more than
two decades of litigation challenging racially discriminatory election
schemes and practices under the Voting Rights Act and the Constitu-
tion. The Supreme Court held as early as 1969 that at-large election
schemes, like literacy tests and other direct barriers to voter registra-
tion, were subject to challenge under the Voting Rights Act because of
their potential to dilute minority voting strength. 6 In so ruling, the
Supreme Court recognized that "the right to vote can be affected by a
dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on cast-
ing a ballot. ' 7
The potentially discriminatory features of at-large election systems
are readily understood. When multiple officeholders are elected at
large from a predominantly white election district, a minority group
within the district may be unable to elect its preferred candidates to
any positions. This occurs when voting is polarized along racial lines.5
The white electorate's ability to control the outcome of all of the elec-
tions under an at-large system creates a winner-take-all advantage for
the majority group; even a substantial minority population may be
effectively disfranchised.
The virtually all-white racial composition of many elected state ju-
diciaries reflects the exclusionary features of at-large voting. Since
1984, the use of at-large elections for state judges has prompted the
filing of voting rights lawsuits in twelve states, including Florida. 9
6. See Fairley v. Patterson, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (companion case to Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969)). In Fairley, the Court ruled that under Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act a legislative change from single-member districts to at-large elections required pre-
clearance by the Department of Justice, because such a change may discriminate against minor-
ity voters. See generally FRANK R. PARKER, BLAcK VoTms CouNT: PoanicAL EMpowmmr IN
MISSssPi AFrER 1965, at 97-99, 170-72 (1990).
7. 393 U.S. at 569.
8. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47-48 (1986). Run-off or majority-vote require-
ments may reinforce this effect, as may the use of staggered terms, designated seats, and large
election districts. Id. at 56. See also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617, 627 (1982).
9. Davis v. Chiles, No. 90-40098 (N.D. Fla. filed June 5, 1990); Nipper v. Chiles, No. 90-
447-CIV-J-16 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 23, 1990) (mem.). These lawsuits went to trial in October and
were awaiting decision. In addition to these suits, in 1988 a plaintiff acting pro se filed a voting
rights suit challenging circuit and county court elections in Hillsborough County. Al-Hakim v.
Florida, No. 88-01416-CIV-T-10 (M.D. Fla. filed Sept. 21, 1988), judgment for defs. vacated,
948 F.2d 1296 (l1th Cir. 1991). The case was tried on stipulated facts and the district court
entered summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court of appeals vacated and remanded
because the district court had not given the parties proper notice that the court was considering
entry of summary judgment. See Al-Hakim v. Florida, No. 90-4148 (lth Cir. Nov. 12, 1991).
See also League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620
(5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (challenging at-large elections for district judges in nine counties in
19911 JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
The Study Commission's report and the United States Supreme
Court's recent decisions combine to make this an opportune time to
examine the impact of the Voting Rights Act on judicial elections. To
place these developments in the context of Florida's judicial election
system, part I of this Article describes Florida's election scheme and
those aspects that have been challenged in pending voting rights law-
suits. Part II of the Article describes the background of efforts to ap-
ply the protections of the Voting Rights Act to judicial elections,
including the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Chisom v.
Roemer and Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General. Part III
then discusses the issues on which judicial election lawsuits are likely
to focus in the wake of the Supreme Court's decisions, including is-
sues surrounding the remedies that are available when an at-large judi-
cial election system is found to be discriminatory.
II. FLORIDA'S AT-LARGE ELECTIONS FOR CIRCUIT AND COUNTY
JUDGES
Florida has a two-level trial court system: the circuit courts, which
are trial courts of general jurisdiction, and the county courts, whose
Texas), rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991); Chi-
sor v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir.) (challenging election of two Louisiana Supreme Court
Justices from one supreme court district), cert. denied sub nom. Roemer v. Chisom, 488 U.S.
955 (1988), after remand, 917 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991); Tsosie v.
King, No. CIV91-0905M (D.N.M. filed Sept. 9, 1991) (challenging system for electing New Mex-
ico district court judges in one judicial district, and challenging method for electing magistrates
in one New Mexico county); Lopez v. Monterey County, Cal., No. C-91-20559 (N.D. Cal. filed
Sept. 6, 1991) (challenging changes to election system for municipal court judges in Monterey
County, California); Bradley v. Indiana State Election Bd., No. IP91-898C (S.D. Ind. filed Aug.
9, 1991) (challenging retention elections for local Indiana judges); Cousin v. McWherter, CIV-1-
90-0339 (E.D. Tenn. filed Aug. 31, 1990) (challenging election system for judges of the Eleventh
Judicial Circuit and the Court of General Sessions of Hamilton County, Tennessee); Magnolia
Bar Ass'n v. Lee, No. J90-0413(B) (S.D. Miss. filed Aug. 17, 1990) (challenging system for
selecting Mississippi Supreme Court); Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections, 775 F. Supp. 1470 (S.D.
Ga. 1989) (three-judge court) (challenging changes to Georgia superior court system), aff'd, III
S. Ct. 288 (1990) (mem.); Southern Christian Leadership Conf. v. Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. 511
(M.D. Ala. 1989) (challenging at-large elections for judges in Alabama judicial circuits and dis-
tricts); Hunt v. Arkansas, No. PB-C-89-406 (E.D. Ark. filed July 27, 1989) (challenge to method
of electing supreme court, court of appeals, circuit, chancery, and juvenile court judges in Ar-
kansas); Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. 285 (M.D. La. 1988) (challenging use of multi-member
districts to elect district court, family court, and court of appeal judges in Louisiana), appeal
argued, No. 91-3737 (5th Cir. Nov. 4, 1991); Mallory v. Eyrich, 666 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D. Ohio)
(challenging method of electing municipal judges in an Ohio county), rev'd, 839 F.2d 275 (6th
Cir. 1988); Williams v. State Bd. of Elections, 696 F. Supp. 1563 (N.D. Il1. 1988) (challenging at-
large system for electing supreme court, appellate court, and circuit court judges in Cook
County, Illinois; and appointment system for selecting associate circuit court judges in Cook
County); Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (challenging use of multi-mem-
ber districts to elect chancery court chancellors, and district and circuit court judges throughout
Mississippi; and of at-large, numbered post election method to elect county judges in three Mis-
sissippi counties); Alexander v. Martin, No. 86-1048-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. filed Oct. 2, 1986) (chal-
lenging at-large elections for superior court judges in North Carolina).
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jurisdiction is limited by subject matter and by the amount in contro-
versy.'0 The judges on these courts are elected in circuitwide or coun-
tywide at-large voting." Although mid-term vacancies on the circuit
and county courts may be filled by appointment, a judge appointed to
such a vacancy must stand for election at the expiration of the term
for which the appointment was made.12
The number of judges in a circuit or county varies widely across the
state, with the number of circuit judges per circuit ranging from four
to sixty-five and the number of county judges per county ranging
from one to thirty-six.13 Regardless of the number of judges on the
court, under the at-large election system all of the voters in the circuit
or county vote on each individual seat on the court. All of the judicial
circuits in Florida have electorates that are predominantly white, as do
all but one of the counties in Florida. 4
The at-large system of electing circuit and county judges in Florida
has produced a trial court judiciary that has very few minority mem-
bers. Figures compiled by the Honorable Robert A. Young in 1990
show that the majority of Florida's twenty judicial circuits had neither
black nor Hispanic judges on the circuit bench.'5 The findings of the
Study Commission confirm the low numbers of minority judges
among the elected judiciary, noting that only five minority judges-of
630 elected judges-in the state attained their posts on the circuit or
county courts in at-large elections. 16
The exclusionary effects of at-large judicial elections have been par-
ticularly severe in the northern part of the state, as the findings of the
10. FLA. STAT. §§ 26.012, 34.01 (1989).
11. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(b). Appellate judges and justices of the Supreme Court do not
run in traditional contested elections. Instead, they are initially appointed to office and every six
years are subject to retention elections in which the electorate may vote for or against retention
of the judge. Id. §§ 10, 11(a).
12. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 11(b).
13. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.031, 34.022 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
14. See BURAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM RCE, 1990 CPH-1-1l, 1990 CENSUS
OF POPULATION AND HouSING, FLORIDA 52 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 CENsus]. Gadsden County,
Florida, has a black population majority of 57.7%. Id. Dade County, which comprises the 11th
Judicial Circuit, has a predominantly white population under the Census classification, which
classifies Hispanics as either white or black. When Hispanics are treated as a separate classifica-
tion, neither blacks, Hispanics, nor non-Hispanic whites form an outright majority in Dade
County. Id.
15. Robert A. Young, Single Member Judicial Districts, Fair or Foul?, FLA. B. NEws, May
1, 1990, at4, 5 (tbl.).
16. CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSmIITY, UNIVERSIrrY OF FLORIDA, RAciL AND ETu-
mc DIVERsn oF TEE FLORIDA JUSTICE SYSTEM pt. 2, at 21-22 (1990) (study commissioned by the
Fla. Sup. Ct. Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Comm'n) (available at the Supreme Court Archives,
Tallahassee, Fla.).
The remaining minority judges initially attained their seats through appointment to mid-term
vacancies. Id. pt. 2, at 21.
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Study Commission confirm.1 7 In the northern region of the state, fifty
percent of sitting judges surveyed agreed that at-large elections favor
nonminority candidates; only forty percent disagreed."' These results
are especially noteworthy because many of the judges surveyed were
elected under the current at-large system and would not be expected to
call it discriminatory.
The discriminatory impact of at-large elections for local govern-
mental bodies has been the subject of voting rights litigation for many
years, again particularly in the northern part of the state. The counties
of Bradford, Escambia, Gadsden, and Leon are among those where
at-large election schemes for school board members, county commis-
sioners, or other local elected offices have either been struck down by
the courts or changed through consent decrees.19 Judicial election law-
suits are also pending in this region of the state, filed by black voters
in Tallahassee and Jacksonville to challenge at-large elections as they
operate in the Second 2 and Fourth2' Judicial Circuits and the Leon
and Duval County Courts. The Second Judicial Circuit, with a black
population of nearly thirty percent, has never had a black judge. In
the Fourth Judicial Circuit, where there are twenty-eight circuit judges
and a black population of twenty-one percent, only one black judge
sits on the bench.2
17. See id. pt. 2, at 10.
18. The remainder had no opinion. See id. pt. 2, at 25 (tbl. 1). For purposes of the study,
the northern region included the counties of Alachua, Baker, Bay, Bradford, Calhoun, Clay,
Columbia, Dixie, Duval, Escambia, Franklin, Gadsden, Gilchrist, Gulf, Hamilton, Homes,
Jackson, Jefferson, Lafayette, Leon, Levy, Liberty, Madison, Nassau, Okaloosa, Santa Rosa,
Suwannee, Taylor, Union, Wakulla, Walton, and Washington. Id. pt. 2, at 10 n.26.
19. See Tallahassee Branch of NAACP v. Leon County, 827 F.2d 1436, 1437 (11th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 960 (1988); McMillan v. Escambia County, 748 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir.
1984); NAACP v. Gadsden County Sch. Bd., 691 F.2d 978 (11th Cir. 1982); Bradford County
NAACP v. City of Starke, 712 F. Supp. 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1989). See also Solomon v. Liberty
County, 899 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam, en banc) (holding that plaintiffs had dem-
onstrated, as a matter of law, a number of relevant factors, including the existence of legally
significant racially polarized voting, and remanding to the district court), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
670 (1991).
20. See supra note 9. The Second Judicial Circuit includes the counties of Gadsden, Frank-
lin, Jefferson, Leon, Liberty, and Wakuila. FLA. STAT. § 26.021(2) (1989).
21. See supra note 9. The Fourth Judicial Circuit includes the counties of Clay, Duval, and
Nassau. FLA. STAT. § 26.021(4) (1989).
22. The Second Judicial Circuit, which includes Tallahassee, is 28.9 percent black in total
population, while Leon County is 24.2 percent black. 1990 CENsus, supra note 14, at 52. The
Second Judicial Circuit and the Leon County Court together have 14 judges. Like the Second
Judicial Circuit, the Leon County Court has never had a black judge. The Fourth Judicial Cir-
cuit, which includes Jacksonville, is 21.1% black, and Duval County is 24.4% black. Id. The
Duval County Court, with 12 judges, had its second black judge appointed only a few months
ago. No black candidate has ever prevailed in a contested election for a seat on that court or on
the Fourth Judicial Circuit. The black judges all obtained their positions through appointments
to mid-term vacancies.
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The Supreme Court's recent decisions concerning judicial elections3
have given new impetus to judicial election challenges such as the
pending Florida lawsuits. As those decisions indicate, the effort to
find an exemption for judicial elections in Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act faced formidable obstacles in the plain language of the
statute, the legislative history, and prior Supreme Court decisions con-
struing parallel provisions of the Voting Rights Act. The next section
describes this background and the Supreme Court's rulings.
III. SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
Two cases before the United States Supreme Court last term pre-
sented the question of whether Section 2's protections against racially
discriminatory election practices apply to elections for judges. League
of United Latin American Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clementsu
was a challenge to at-large elections for trial judges in several Texas
counties. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc and overruling a Fifth Cir-
cuit panel decision handed down just two years earlier, 2 held that Sec-
tion 2 was inapplicable to the challenged elections. Seven members of
the Fifth Circuit held that Congress, in amending Section 2 in 1982,
had employed the term "representatives" to exclude judicial elections
from coverage.26 Another four members, while strongly disagreeing
with this interpretation of the word "representatives," concluded that
single-member offices are excluded from the section's coverage and
that trial judges (but not appellate judges) hold single-member offices
and are therefore excluded from coverage. 27 One member of the court,
while leaving open the possibility that Section 2 might apply to certain
types of judicial elections, would have held that Section 2 excludes
elections for judgeships where the judges' jurisdiction is geographi-
cally coextensive with the district from which they are elected.28 Only
one judge dissented, concluding that Section 2 contains no exemption
for any elected office.29
23. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991); Chisom v. Roemer,
I IIS. Ct. 2354 (1991).
24. 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
25. Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Roemer v. Chi-
som, 488 U.S. 955 (1988), after remand, 917 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd, III S. Ct. 2354
(1991).
26. 914 F.2d at 620-34.
27. Id. at 634-51 (Higginbotham, J., concurring, joined by Politz, King, and Davis, JJ.).
28. Id. at 631-34 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
29. Id. at 651-71 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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The other Section 2 case that went to the Supreme Court with Cle-
ments was Chisom v. Roemer 0 In Chisom, black Louisiana voters,
joined by the United States as plaintiff-intervenor, challenged a multi-
member district used to elect two Louisiana Supreme Court justices
from the geographical area including New Orleans. Based on its ruling
in Clements, the Fifth Circuit remanded Chisom to the district court
with instructions to dismiss the complaint.31 The United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in both cases and consolidated them
for argument.
Despite the doctrinal complexities suggested by the Fifth Circuit's
fractured decision in Clements, until 1990 the question of Section 2's
coverage of judicial elections did not appear destined to reach the Su-
preme Court. Up to that point, the lower courts were virtually unani-
mous in concluding that Congress did not exclude judicial elections
from the coverage of amended Section 2.32 The first lawsuit challeng-
ing at-large judicial elections under amended Section 2 was filed in
1984,3 only two years after the amendment. By 1988, the two courts
of appeals to hear argument on the issue had concluded, without elab-
orate discussion, that no special exemption for judicial elections could
be found in Section 2.14 After those decisions, not a single lower court
held otherwise until the Fifth Circuit revisited the issue in Clements.3 5
There were several reasons for this consensus among the lower
courts. First, it was well understood that Congress amended Section 2
30. 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991). Chisom v. Roemer was the same case in which the Fifth Circuit
had initially ruled that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act covers judicial elections. See Chisom
v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Roemer v. Chisom, 488 U.S. 955
(1988). After trial on the merits, however, the district court ruled against the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs then appealed to the Fifth Circuit, but before the appeal was heard the Fifth Circuit
issued its decision in League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914
F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen.,
111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991), overruling the earlier Chisom decision.
31. 917 F.2d 187 (1990).
32. See Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1988), rev'g 666 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D. Ohio
1987); Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d at 1056; Southern Christian Leadership Conf. v. Siegel-
man, 714 F. Supp. 511 (M.D. Ala. 1989); Williams v. State Bd. of Elections, 696 F. Supp. 1563
(N.D. Il. 1988); Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
33. Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
34. Mallory, 839 F.2d at 279; Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d at 1056. As Judge Higgin-
botham noted in his concurrence in Clements, then-Solicitor General Charles Fried and then-
head of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division William Bradford Reynolds supported
the plaintiffs' position that Section 2 applies to judicial elections when the issue was first before
the Fifth Circuit in 1988 in Chisom v. Edwards. See Clements, 914 F.2d at 642. The Solicitor
General and the Justice Department maintained that position throughout the subsequent litiga-
tion. See Chisom v. Roemer, I I S. Ct. at 2358.
35. Lower courts in other circuits continued to refuse to dismiss voting rights challenges to
at-large judicial elections even after the Fifth Circuit's Clements decision. See Nipper v. Chiles,
No. 90-447-CIV-J-16 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 23, 1990) (mem.).
1991]
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of the Voting Rights Act in 1982 to broaden the Act's coverage by
eliminating any requirement of proving a discriminatory intent behind
the use of a challenged election scheme or practice.3 6 The amendment
was a response to the Supreme Court's decision in City of Mobile v.
Bolden,3 7 which had read Section 2 to incorporate an intent test.3 8 It
was also generally conceded, even by the Clements court, that Section
2 had applied to judicial elections before its amendment in 1982.19 The
amendment process in 1982, while marked by prolonged wrangling
over whether the intent requirement should be eliminated, 40 included
no evidence of a debate about whether the categories of elections and
elected officials subject to the Act should be narrowed. 41
36. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986). To accomplish this change, Congress
altered Section 2's original language, which had prohibited practices "imposed or applied.., to
deny or abridge the right ... to vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976)
(emphasis added). The new language banned practices "imposed or applied ... in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right... to vote on account of race or color"
(emphasis added). This section of the Act was designated as 2(a), and a new section 2(b) was
added, which states:
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality
of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its
members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which
members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdi-
vision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this
section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers
equal to their proportion in the population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
37. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
38. See Oingles, 478 U.S. at 35.
39. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620,
631 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Clark, C.J., concurring), rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n
v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991); id. at 637 (Higginbotham, J., concurring). The parties
before the Supreme Court in Chisom v. Roemer also conceded that Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act applied to judicial elections before 1982. 111 S. Ct. at 2360.
40. See Clements, 914 F.2d at 640-41 (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (citing legislative de-
bate over replacement of an "intent" standard with a "results" test).
41. In fact, there was extensive evidence in the legislative history supporting the conclusion
that all elections, including judicial elections, remained within the coverage of amended Section
2. At the 1981 and 1982 congressional hearings in both the House and the Senate, minority
witnesses and representatives of civil rights organizations testified about discrimination in judi-
cial elections, presented examples of how vote dilution hampered the election of minority judges,
and articulated the need for better minority representation on the bench. See Voting Rights Act,
1982: Hearings on S. 53, S. 1761, S. 1975, S. 1992, and H.R. 3112 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 669, 748 (1983); Ex-
tension of the Voting Rights Act, 1981: Hearings on H.R. 1407, H.R. 1731, H.R. 2942, H.R.
3112, H.R. 3198, H.R. 3473, and H.R. 3498 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 234, 516-28, 550, 571, 574,
825, 930, 940-42, 949, 1253, 1745, 2647-48 (1982).
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Second, in 1986 the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a lower
court decision holding that the preclearance provisions of Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act apply to judicial election laws and practices. 42
The same definition of "vote" and "voting" applies to Sections 2 and
5 of the Voting Rights Act. "Vote" and "voting" are defined to in-
clude "all action necessary to make a vote effective in any primary,
special, or general election, including, but not limited to... casting a
ballot and having such ballot counted properly ... with respect to
candidates for public or party office." 43 Judges who must stand for
election are clearly "candidates for public ... office,"" and are
therefore included in the definition. No cogent reason exists for read-
ing the coverage of Section 2 and Section 5 differently, given their
shared definition of key terms.
Third, there is a very simple explanation for Congress' use of the
word "representatives" in amended Section 2-an explanation that
does not imply any intent to exclude judges. The portion of amended
Section 2 containing the word "representatives" was taken directly
from language in White v. Regester,45 a vote dilution case that refers
to minority groups whose members have less opportunity than others
"to participate in the political process and to elect legislators of their
choice."4 In amending Section 2, Congress adopted this language but
substituted the word "representatives" for the word "legislators." 47
As the Sixth Circuit stated in Mallory v. Eyrich," "[it seems evident
that Congress was seeking a broader word to make it clear that sub-
section (b) is not limited to legislative races. ' 49 Because the elections
and offices covered are defined in Section 14(c)(1) of the Act,50 the
drafters of amended Section 2 did not list all covered offices by title,
but simply substituted a generic term for elected officers in place of
the word "legislators."
42. Haith v. Martin, 618 F. Supp. 410 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (three judge court), aff'd, 477 U.S.
901 (1986) (mem.). In 1990, just after the en banc Clements decision, the Supreme Court again
summarily affirmed an appeal from a three-judge court decision holding Section 5 applicable to
judicial elections. See Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections, 775 F. Supp. 1470 (S.D. Ga. 1989),
aff'd, III S. Ct. 288 (1990) (mem.). See also Clark v. Roemer, II S. Ct. 2096 (1991) (holding,
in full opinion, that Section 5 applies to changes in judicial election laws).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(1) (1988).
44. Id.
45. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
46. Id. at 766.
47. See supra note 36 (text of Section 2(b)).
48. 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1988).
49. Id. at 279.
50. See supra text accompanying note 43.
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Given this background, the panel decision in Clements holding trial
judge elections exempt from Section 2, and the subsequent en banc
decision holding all judicial elections exempt from coverage, marked a
surprising rejection of the previous consensus among lower courts.
The decisions are probably best explained by the en banc majority's
clear discomfort with the very notion of an elected judiciary51 and, for
those judges joining Judge Higginbotham's concurrence, their deep
philosophical aversion to the use of standard remedial schemes to re-
place at-large judicial elections.5 2
The Supreme Court, in reversing, found these policy-oriented con-
siderations unpersuasive. In Chisom v. Roemer, Justice Stevens, writ-
ing for six members of the Court, held that no exemption for judicial
elections could be found in the language or legislative history of
amended Section 2.53 The word "representatives" could not be read to
exclude judges without calling into question the coverage of a whole
variety of nonlegislative offices that were concededly encompassed by
the Act. The Court held that "[i]f executive officers, such as prosecu-
tors, sheriffs, state attorneys general, and state treasurers, can be con-
sidered 'representatives' simply because they are chosen by popular
election, then the same reasoning should apply to elected judges." 54
The Supreme Court noted the Fifth Circuit's concern that judges
not be controlled by popular will in their decisionmaking. This policy
preference had not, however, prevented Louisiana from deciding to
elect its judges and, in the Court's view, could not control the ques-
tion of Section 2's coverage. "The fundamental tension between the
ideal character of the judicial office and the real world of electoral
politics," Justice Stevens wrote in Chisom, "cannot be resolved by
crediting judges with total indifference to the popular will while simul-
taneously requiring them to run for elected office."55 The Court held
that, having made judges accountable to the public by selecting them
through popular elections, Louisiana could not claim an exemption
from Section 2's requirements of racial fairness in the electoral proc-
ess.
In Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General, the same six-
Justice majority rejected Judge Higginbotham's "single-member of-
51. See League of Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620, 625-26
(5th Cir. 1990) (en band) (citing descriptions of the appointed federal judiciary as evidence of the
nature of judicial office), rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct.
2376 (1991).
52. Id. at 649-51 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
53. 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2368 (1991).
54. Id. at 2366.
55. Id. at 2367.
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fice" theory, under which elections for appellate judges but not trial
judges would be covered by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.5 6
Judge Higginbotham's opinion in Clements had focused on what he
considered the undesirability of electing trial judges from subdis-
tricts,5 7 the remedy often sought when at-large elections are found to
dilute minority voting strength.58 According to Judge Higginbotham,
the state's interest in maintaining an election district coextensive with
the trial judge's jurisdiction is of such importance that at-large elec-
tions for trial judges are beyond the reach of Section 2.19 In a related
argument, Judge Higginbotham also urged that, because trial judges
exercise authority independently of each other, they should be deemed
to hold "single-member" offices, which by definition cannot be sub-
divided to remedy any dilution of minority voting strength. 60
In reversing, the Supreme Court again held that such policy con-
cerns did not control the issue of statutory coverage. Justice Stevens
wrote:
Even if we assume, arguendo, that the State's interest in electing
judges on a district-wide basis may preclude a remedy that involves
redrawing boundaries or subdividing districts, or may even preclude
a finding that vote dilution has occurred under the "totality of the
circumstances" in a particular case, that interest does not justify
excluding elections for single-member offices from the coverage of
the § 2 results test.61
Houston Lawyers' Ass'n, like Chisom, thus embraced a broad inter-
pretation of the coverage of Section 2. If a state holds elections for
56. I11 S. Ct. 2376 (1991).
57. League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620, 645-
51 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S.
Ct. 2376 (1991).
58. Drawing subdistricts for election purposes is one method of remedying the dilution of
minority voting strength caused by at-large election systems. One or more subdistricts can gener-
ally be drawn in which minorities will constitute the majority of the voting age population, per-
mitting minorities to elect candidates of their choice to some of the seats. See generally Clark v.
Roemer, 777 F. Supp. 471, 479-83 (M.D. La. 1991), appeal argued, No. 91-3737 (5th Cir. Nov.
4, 1991); Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988). The term "subdistricts" rather
than "single-member districts" is used in this Article because the latter term is often a misno-
mer; as illustrated in the Clark litigation, subdistricts electing more than one judge each can
often be used in a remedial plan under Section 2. Clark v. Roemer, Judgment (M.D. La. Aug.
30, 1991). In addition, the term "subdistricts" accurately reflects that the larger original district
is often retained for purposes of jurisdiction and judicial administration. See Martin, 700 F.
Supp. at 332-33.
59. Clements, 914 F.2d at 645-47.
60. Id. at 646-51.
61. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376, 2380-81 (1991).
1991]
680 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLA W REVIEW [Vol. 19:669
trial judges, "those elections must be conducted in compliance with
the Voting Rights Act." '62
The six-three Supreme Court majority that handed a major victory
to minority voters in these two cases probably does not, for better or
for worse, represent a sudden surge of liberal activism on the increas-
ingly conservative Court. It indicates instead that there was remarka-
bly little support for the positions taken by the Fifth Circuit majority
and the Higginbotham concurrence. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit's
unsound statutory construction was bad policy. Lost in the Fifth Cir-
cuit's alarum about possible harm to state interests was the fact that
its interpretation would create a safe harbor for racially discrimina-
tory practices in judicial elections. As the report of the Florida Su-
preme Court Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission recognizes,
the justice system is the last place where exemptions from civil rights
protections should be sought.63
IV. IssuEs IN FUTURE LITIGATION CONCERNING JUDICAL ELECTIONS
Future litigation concerning judicial elections is likely to focus on
several issues that will arise in the wake of the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Chisom and Houston Lawyers' Ass'n. In Houston Lawyers'
Ass'n, the Court suggested that a state's interest in a particular elec-
toral system may be evaluated at some stage of the litigation, but it
did not define the role that such an evaluation should play. The Court
also took no position on the merits of Judge Higginbotham's criti-
cisms of the use of subdistricts for judicial elections, nor on the evi-
dence a state would have to muster to prove that its interests preclude
the use of a particular remedy. In addition, dictum in Chisom con-
cerning appointive systems has led to some speculation that a switch
to so-called "merit retention" systems for judicial selection may pro-
vide an escape route for states where litigation is pending. These issues
are addressed below.
A. The Role of State Interest Analysis in Section 2 Challenges After
Chisom v. Roemer and Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General
As noted earlier, 64 Judge Higginbotham's concurring opinion in
Clements gave overriding weight to asserted state interests in "link-
ing" a court's electoral base and jurisdiction. While holding that such
interests do not control Section 2's coverage, the Houston Lawyers'
62. Id.at2380.
63. STUDY COMMSSION, supra note 1, at 608, 610-12.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
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Ass'n opinion creates some ambiguity as to the role such interests may
play in Section 2 litigation. The opinion suggests that the interests
identified by Judge Higginbotham, while irrelevant to the question of
Section 2's coverage, may be relevant "either to an analysis of the
totality of the circumstances"-i.e., at the liability stage of a Section
2 case-"or to a consideration of possible remedies in the event a vio-
lation is proved." 65 The Court thus appeared to reserve decision as to
the stage of the litigation when such interests would come into play.
Later in the opinion, however, Justice Stevens asserts that "the State's
interest in maintaining an electoral system ... is a legitimate factor to
be considered" 66 in determining whether Section 2 has been violated-
albeit "merely one factor." 67 The opinion does not resolve the appar-
ent inconsistency between these two different statements.
The legislative history of Section 2, however, provides direct guid-
ance on this issue by expressly addressing the role of "state interest"
analysis in determining liability under Section 2. The Senate Report
accompanying amended Section 2 lists seven "typical factors" proba-
tive in determining whether, under the totality of the circumstances,
an electoral scheme denies minority voters an equal opportunity to
participate in the electoral process and elect candidates of their
choice. 68 Two additional factors are also listed that "in some cases
have had probative value as part of plaintiffs' evidence," 69 including
65. 111 S. Ct. at 2380 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 2381.
67. Id.
68. See S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07. The "typical factors" to be considered by a court include:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdi-
vision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote,
or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is
racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large
election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other vot-
ing practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination
against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority
group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdi-
vision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and
health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial ap-
peals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public
office in the jurisdiction.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
69. Id. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207.
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whether the policies underlying the use of a challenged practice are
tenuous.70
A consideration of state interests in an electoral scheme thus plays a
limited role under Section 2. The factor is expressly restricted to a
lesser role than the first seven factors listed in the Senate Report. The
Senate Report, moreover, makes the state interests factor merely an
optional part of the plaintiffs' case, and it expressly states that the
"failure of plaintiff to establish any particular factor.., is not rebut-
tal evidence of non-dilution." 7'
Thus, under the evidentiary framework set forth in the Senate Re-
port, state interests come into play at the liability stage only if plain-
tiffs undertake to bolster their case by proving that state interests in a
particular election system are tenuous. Even if the court is not per-
suaded that this factor weighs in plaintiffs' favor, that conclusion can-
not require a finding for defendantsY2 Instead, the ultimate inquiry
remains whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the electoral
system results in discrimination against minority voters. 3 As the Sen-
ate Report cautions, "even a consistently applied practice premised on
a racially neutral policy would not negate a plaintiff's showing
through other factors that the challenged practice denies minorities
fair access to the process. "74
Permitting state interests to trump a showing of vote dilution not
only is inconsistent with specific provisions of the Senate Report but
also would directly undermine the primary purpose behind the 1982
amendment of Section 2. The purpose of the amendment was to make
clear that plaintiffs could prevail without showing that a particular
electoral scheme had been employed for an invidious purpose.75 If a
state were allowed to rebut a showing of vote dilution by demonstrat-
ing a legitimate interest in using the challenged at-large system, the
existence of a Section 2 violation would depend, as it did before 1982,
upon the state's intent in using the practice. Thus, any analysis of
state interests must be carefully circumscribed to avoid a direct con-
70. Id. The remaining factor is whether elected officials have been unresponsive to the par-
ticularized needs of the minority group. Id. The Senate Report cautions that "there is no re-
quirement that any particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them point one
way or the other." Id. The Supreme Court in Gingles held that the Senate Report is an authori-
tative statement of Congressional intent behind the amendment of Section 2. Thornburg v. Gin-
gles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7 (1986).
71. S. REP. No. 417, at 29 n.118, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207 n.118.
72. See id.
73. See generally Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376, 2381 (1991).
74. S. REP. No. 417, at 29 n.117, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207 n.117.
75. Id. at 28, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 117, 205-06; Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35
(1986).
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flict with Congress' decision to eliminate an intent requirement
through the 1982 amendment of Section 2.
Elevating the state's interests to a central role in vote dilution cases
would also conflict with the Supreme Court's only decision thus far
addressing the merits of a challenge to a multi-member election
scheme under amended Section 2. In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Court
canvassed the Senate Report factors and held that two of them-the
existence of racial bloc voting and the extent to which minorities have
been elected in the jurisdiction-are central to a Section 2 claim.7 6 The
Court found the other factors "supportive of, but not essential to," a
showing of a Section 2 violation .7 The explication in Gingles of the
Section 2 "results" test has since been applied in many cases challeng-
ing election schemes for a variety of elected officers. 78 Given the Su-
preme Court's holding that the Section 2 results test applies to
elections for all offices, including judicial offices, it is difficult to ar-
gue that in judicial elections alone the Gingles hierarchy of evidentiary
factors is inapplicable.
If state interests cannot insulate at-large elections from challenge
when the election system is shown to have a racially discriminatory
effect, are states then subject to wholesale revision of their judicial
systems at the whim of a federal judge? For at least two reasons, this
is not a realistic concern.
First, the analysis adopted in Gingles has proved extremely effective
in targeting election schemes that lock minorities out of a meaningful
role in the electoral process while avoiding any broad-brush nullifica-
tion of state election systems. The Clark litigation in Louisiana is a
good example of this.7 9 The case started out as a statewide challenge
76. 478 U.S. 30, 48-50 (1986).
77. Id. at 49 n.15. At stake in Gingles was a long-standing method of electing North Caro-
lina state representatives. Clearly, the selection of such officials is a core state function and
implicates compelling state interests. In Gingles, the State argued that its clearly expressed pref-
erence for using whole counties in legislative districts was a strong, legitimate, and nondiscrimi-
natory basis for the use of multi-member legislative districts. See Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F.
Supp. 345, 373-74 (E.D.N.C. 1984). The three-judge district court found this interest inadequate
to shield the system from attack. The court pointed out that in some cases the State had split
counties in creating legislative districts, and that in any event the State's policy could not justify
the racial vote dilution it had found. The court also discounted the State's policy concern about
avoiding racial gerrymandering. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district
court except in one district where black candidates had been repeatedly elected to office under
the multi-member system. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 80.
78. See, e.g., McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1988) (park district
commissioners), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989); Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of
Gretna, 834 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1989) (city alders); Jackson v.
Edgefield County Sch. Dist., 650 F. Supp. 1176 (D.S.C. 1986) (school board members).
79. Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. 285 (M.D. La. 1988) (initial findings on liability). See
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involving more than forty judicial districts used to elect most of the
trial and intermediate appellate court judges in Louisiana. s0 Upon
conclusion of the litigation in the district court, however, findings of
liability extended to only eleven districts.8' Only those districts where
racially polarized voting had virtually excluded a large minority popu-
lation from an effective voice in judicial elections were found to vio-
late Section 2. Obviously, under the standards set out in Gingles and
the Senate Report, Section 2 is no blunderbuss that indiscriminately
blasts state interests.
Second, state interests in structuring the selection of judicial offi-
cers are properly taken into account at the remedy stage of a voting
rights lawsuit. Once an election system is found impermissibly to di-
lute minority voting strength, the state is afforded an opportunity to
propose and enact an alternative election system that satisfies the re-
quirements of Section 2.82 In determining whether to approve the
state's remedial plan, the court will consider and defer to the state's
policies as long as the remedial plan cures the dilution of minority
voting strength. 3 The state's opportunity to take the lead in fashion-
ing a remedial plan thus offers an adequate safeguard for the state's
interests, without depriving minority voters of Voting Rights Act pro-
tections in judicial elections.
B. Determining the Existence and Strength of Asserted State
Interests in Challenged Election Schemes
The discussion thus far has focused on the abstract issue of how
state interests fit within the conceptual framework of Section 2. What
of the specific state interests that Judge Higginbotham deemed con-
trolling in Clements that have since been advanced by a number of
states seeking to avoid adverse rulings under Section 2?
The argument advanced most strenuously against changing at-large
judicial election systems is that judicial independence will be compro-
mised by electing judges from single-member districts drawn by race.
Instead of applying the law fairly and impartially, judges will, accord-
also Clark v. Roemer, 777 F. Supp. 445 (M.D. La. 1990) (findings of fact and conclusions of law
remedy phase), and 777 F. Supp. 471 (M.D. La. 1991) (supplemental findings of fact and con-
clusions of law), appeal argued, No. 91-3737 (5th Cir. Nov. 4, 1991).
80. Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. at 288, 302.
81. Clark v. Roemer, 777 F. Supp. at 479.
82. See, e.g., Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327, 330 (S.D. Miss. 1988).
83. See Cook v. Luckett, 735 F.2d 912, 918 (5th Cir. 1984). See generally Upham v. Sea-
mon, 456 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1982); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795 (1973).
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ing to this argument, cater to the racial groups they perceive as their
constituents. 84
This criticism turns a blind eye to a number of facts that have not
escaped the notice of minority voters seeking changes in the electoral
system. Perhaps most importantly, the argument assumes that the dis-
tricts from which judges currently are elected have no racial character-
istics. A moment's reflection, however, reveals that the judicial
districts used in most states are now comprised solely of electorates
with an overwhelming white majority. If the creation of judicial dis-
tricts composed predominantly of one racial group compromises judi-
cial independence, then judicial independence now exists nowhere .8
Conversely, if elections from districts that currently are overwhelm-
ingly white do not produce biased judges, then there is no reason to
believe that elections from black majority districts will produce biased
judges.
This criticism also misses a more fundamental point. Judicial elec-
tion lawsuits are not centered on the concern that sitting judges are
prejudiced in one direction and should be replaced by judges preju-
diced in a different direction. Indeed, the notion that minorities have
no interest in judicial elections other than their expectation of appear-
ing before a judge someday is fundamentally offensive. Minorities
have the same interest in judicial elections as do other voters: elected
judges wield important governmental powers, and minorities wish to
have some meaningful opportunity to participate in choosing who will
exercise those powers. Fairness in voting procedures is important even
though most citizens, whether black or white, will never appear as liti-
gants before the judges for whom they vote.
A second argument urged against subdistricts is that states have an
overriding interest in what Judge Higginbotham termed "the linking
of jurisdiction and elective base." '8 6 This is based on the fact that
judges generally exercise jurisdiction throughout the region from
which they are elected. The use of subdistricts, in Judge Higginboth-
am's view, would interfere with an important state policy of assuring
84. See, e.g., Pasquale A. Cipollone, Note, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and Judicial
Elections: Application and Remedy, 58 U. Cm. L. REv. 733, 761-63 (1991).
85. It is sometimes casually assumed that the creation of subdistricts to remedy vote dilu-
tion involves the creation of all-black subdistricts. In fact, the subdistricts created are generally
no more than 65% black in population-sometimes less. See Martin, 700 F. Supp. at 332-33.
The at-large judicial districts currently in use in Florida are generally far more than 65% white in
population. Thus, in many cases the subdistricts that would be created to remedy vote dilution
clearly would be more racially diverse than the districts used under the current system.
86. League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620, 646
(5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct.
2376 (1991).
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that litigants appear before judges for whom they had the opportunity
to vote.87
Arguments based on this "linkage" notion are problematic for sev-
eral reasons. States generally do not require that a judge exercise juris-
diction only over litigants who have had an opportunity to vote for
the judge. Assignment rules generally permit judges elected in one dis-
trict to sit on cases in a different district when necessary or conven-
ient, and even retired judges who are not accountable to any
electorate may be assigned to help with burdensome caseloads.8 8 Even
when sitting within their own districts, judges are frequently called
upon to decide cases involving litigants from other districts; indeed,
this happens whenever a resident of one district sues a resident of an-
other district. Judges are assumed to be capable of acting fairly in
these situations; if they do not act fairly, the remedy lies in appeal.
The assumption that a judge will obey the oath to act impartially
surely should not be withheld in the case of judges elected from sub-
districts that permit some minority access to the bench.
A further argument, also based on assertions concerning judicial in-
dependence, is that states have an interest in avoiding the use of elec-
tion districts smaller than those currently employed. The assumption
is that judges elected from smaller districts will be subject to greater
political pressure.8 9 Again, the current election systems in many states
do not bear out these assertions. The size of judicial election districts
may vary widely within a particular state, and subdistricts proposed as
remedies in judicial election lawsuits are often larger than some of the
districts currently used by the state to elect judges.9 In addition, in
many areas it is unnecessary to use single-member districts in a Sec-
87. Id. at 651.
88. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 26.57 (1989) (assignment of county judges to sit as circuit
judges); FLA. R. Jun. ADmin. 2.030(a)(3)(A) (assignment of judges by Chief Justice of Florida
Supreme Court). Clearly, Florida recognizes no constitutional or other right for a litigant to
appear before a judge for whom the litigant had an opportunity to vote.
89. See Clark v. Roemer, 777 F. Supp. 471, 481-82 (M.D. La. 1991) (discussing witnesses'
testimony that small election districts threaten state interests).
90. Id. at 480. In Clark, the district court reasoned:
The State's own actions refute any argument that there is any actual State policy as to
the size of judicial election districts. The smallest subdistrict which will be drawn as a
remedy in this matter contains 13,000 people and is larger than three districts that
have been created by the State.
Id.
Similarly, Florida counties and judicial circuits vary widely in size. The countries, for exam-
ple, vary enormously in population from less than 6000 to more than 1,900,000, yet each county
elects at least one judge. 1990 CENSUS, supra note 14, at 52. It cannot be seriously argued that
the judges elected in the smaller counties are less capable of acting impartially than the judges
elected in large counties.
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tion 2 remedy-multi-member subdistricts electing several judges each
are often possible, especially in urban areas.91 States that currently
permit judges to run for election in small counties or election districts
surely have no legitimate interest in avoiding the use of similarly pop-
ulated subdistricts to remedy unlawful dilution of minority voting
strength.Y
Moreover, the dire predictions about the consequences of using sub-
districts for judicial elections are generally made with little recognition
that such systems are already in use in several jurisdictions, either as a
result of voting rights litigation93 or because the state simply has cho-
sen to set up its courts in that manner. 94 Persons familiar with the
operation of judicial subdistricts in Mississippi, the first state where
such a remedy was ordered, have not observed threats to the inde-
pendence of the judiciary or other untoward consequences from the
use of subdistricts for judicial elections. 95
The state interest arguments discussed above rest on objections to
the use of subdistricts as a remedy for minority vote dilution in at-
large judicial elections. While the use of subdistricts is unlikely to
threaten genuine state interests, other remedial options are available.
Alternative remedies include modified at-large systems96 used in a
91. See Clark v. Roemer, Judgment (Aug. 30, 1991).
92. If a state's interests in its current election system are contended to comprise a relevant
factor under Section 2's totality of circumstances test, the existence of those interests must be
proved, not simply assumed. Otherwise, the mere assertion of a state interest in its current
method of electing judges would immunize the election scheme from challenge under Section 2,
achieving through the back door an exemption for judicial elections that was clearly rejected by
the Supreme Court in Chisom and in Houston Lawyers' Ass'n. Demonstrating the existence and
strength of an asserted state interest is not necessarily an easy matter. In Clark v. Roemer, the
first judicial elections case to go to judgment following Chisom and Houston Lawyers' Ass'n,
the court found that little evidence supported the defendants' claims of an overriding state inter-
est in maintaining an at-large election system. Clark v. Roemer, 777 F. Supp. at 479-82.
93. See Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (court ordered the use of
subdistricts after legislature declined opportunity to devise remedial system); 1987 N.C. Sess.
Laws 509 (adopting use of subdistricts to nominate superior court judges in response to voting
rights litigation). See also 1989 Ill. Laws 86-786 (establishing judicial subdistricts in Cook
County as a result of voting rights litigation; elections under new system scheduled for 1992).
94. See N.Y. CoNsr. art. VI, § 15(a) (election of judges on citywide court from districts
within counties).
95. See Clark v. Roemer, 777 F. Supp. at 477 (citing testimony of a judge elected in 1990
from a black majority subdistrict in Hinds County, Mississippi, and of a white lawyer and presi-
dent of the Bench-Bar Relations Committee of the Hinds County Bar Association).
96. See Edward Still, Voluntary Constituencies: Modified At-Large Voting as a Remedy for
Minority Vote Dilution in Judicial Elections, 9 YALE L. & PO,'Y REV. 354 (1991). Modified at-
large systems include so-called "limited voting" and "cumulative voting" schemes. Under a lim-
ited-voting system, officeholders are elected at-large from a multi-member electoral district;
however, each voter is "limited" to casting a total number of votes that is less than the number
of seats up for election. If a minority group votes cohesively for a particular candidate or set of
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number of jurisdictions and adopted as a remedy in several voting
rights cases.97 These remedies do not involve the creation of subdis-
tricts and therefore do not implicate the concerns canvassed above.
The availability of remedies that do not require the creation of subdis-
tricts renders criticisms of subdistricts irrelevant, at least at the liabil-
ity stage of a Section 2 case.
Moreover, state interest analysis, if relevant, cannot be a one-way
street. Florida, for example, has declared through legislative enact-
ments and studies by competent agencies a compelling interest in elim-
inating racially discriminatory practices and assuring diversity
throughout state government.98 Not only minority voters, but also
states themselves, have a strong interest in avoiding the use of election
practices that systematically exclude minorities from equal participa-
tion in the electoral process. There is, therefore, no intrinsic reason
why deference to state interests will necessarily weigh against a finding
of unlawful vote dilution.9
C. Do Merit Retention Elections Offer an Escape Route from the
Voting Rights Act?
The Supreme Court in Chisom noted that an elected judiciary by its
very nature reflects a state's decision to require public accountability
candidates under such a system, it cannot be prevented from electing at least one candidate of its
choice, even if the majority votes for different candidates. Cumulative voting schemes are simi-
lar, except that they equalize minority and majority voting strength by allotting each voter a
number of votes equal to the number of candidates being elected and permitting the voter to
concentrate all of his or her votes on one candidate.
As an example of how limited voting works, consider an election held under the following
circumstances. Four seats are up for election; each voter is limited to casting one vote; and all
candidates for the four seats run in one pool, with the top four vote getters winning election. If
minorities constitute more than 20% of the population and unite behind one candidate, that
candidate will be among the top four vote-getters, even if the white majority casts no votes for
the minority candidate. This is true because if whites constitute less than four-fifths of the popu-
lation, they cannot produce enough votes for four different white candidates to fill up all four
seats. Of course, different variations are possible depending on the minority population percent-
age and the number of seats up for election.
97. See Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in
Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 H~Av. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 173, 223-36 (1989).
98. STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 1. See also Ch. 85-104, 1985 Fla. Laws 627, 628-29, 650
(findings by Legislature concerning discrimination against minorities and minority business en-
terprises).
99. The post-Chisom decision in Clark v. Roemer took note of this aspect of state interest
analysis, rejecting "the notion that the State has a greater interest in linking election district and
geographical jurisdiction in judicial election districts than in ridding judicial elections of minor-
ity vote dilution." 777 F. Supp. at 483-84.
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for judges. In effect, the Court chided Louisiana for insisting that
elections do not threaten judicial independence but that the Voting
Rights Act does. Unfortunately, in making this point the Court may
have created confusion on another issue. The Court stated that
"Louisiana could, of course, exclude its judiciary from the coverage
of the Voting Rights Act by changing to a system in which judges are
appointed." 0
The Court's dictum fails to address a number of problems that
would arise if a state attempted to avoid Section 2 liability by chang-
ing from an elective to an appointive system for selecting judges.
First, changes in judicial election procedures, like changes in any
other election procedures, are subject to the preclearance requirements
of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act'01 in jurisdictions covered by
Section 5.102 Accordingly, those jurisdictions would have to get ap-
proval from the United States Department of Justice or the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia before eliminating
their election system for judges. 10 3 Preclearance will be denied unless
the jurisdiction meets the burden of establishing that the submitted
change does not have a racially discriminatory purpose and will not
have a racially discriminatory effect.'0 4 If an election system is elimi-
nated in favor of an appointive system in response to litigation under
Section 2, a jurisdiction will face the difficult task of explaining why
such a change was made just at the moment when the election system
was about to be opened to meaningful participation by minority vot-
ers.
A switch from an elective to an appointive system may also be chal-
lenged under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, whether or not the
state in question is covered by Section 5. The House Judiciary Com-
mittee Report that accompanies the 1982 amendment of Section 2 spe-
cifically mentions "shifts from elective to appointive office" as an
100. Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2367 (1991).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988). See Clark v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct.-2096, 2101 (1991) (Section 5
applies to changes in judicial election laws and practices).
102. Five counties in Florida are subject to the preclearance requirements of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act: Collier, Hardee, Hendry, Hillsborough, and Monroe. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 55
(1991) (app.). This requires Florida to obtain preclearance under Section 5 before implementing
any change in its election system for judges.
103. See Bunton v. Patterson, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (companion case to Allen v. State Bd. of
Educ., 393 U.S. 544 (1969)) (holding that a change from an elective system to an appointive
system requires preclearance under Section 5). In Presley v. Etowah County Commission, the
Supreme Court, while holding that certain changes in the internal procedures of governing bod-
ies are not covered by Section 5, reaffirmed in dicta that changes from elective to appointive
office are subject to Section 5 preclearance, citing Bunton with approval. 60 U.S.L.W. 4135,
4138-40 (1992).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 536-37, 541 (1973).
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example of "practices or procedures in the electoral process" that
may violate Section 2 under the totality of the circumstances test.105
Although some cases have rejected Section 2 challenges to appointive
systems that have been in effect for many years,106 a shift from an
elective system to an appointive system at a time when minorities are
poised to achieve fair participation in the electoral process would be
an entirely different matter.1 7
Furthermore, the Court's statement concerning appointive systems
may well have been made with reference to the pure appointive sys-
tems similar to those used for federal judges, not the merit retention
systems often used by states in selecting judges. Merit retention sys-
tems include an election component: judges are initially appointed to
office but must be approved by the voters at a later election in which
voters may vote "yes" or "no" on retention of the judge.108 Switching
to retention elections in areas where there are few or no black judges
would effectively exclude minority candidates. Given the broad inter-
pretation of the Voting Rights Act's coverage in Chisom and Houston
Lawyers' Ass'n, judicial selection systems that include an election
component are unlikely to be exempted from scrutiny under Section
2.109
V. CONCLUSION
In amending Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1982, Congress
reaffirmed that assuring racial fairness in election practices remains an
important national priority. The effort to exempt judicial elections
from the protections of Section 2 clashed directly with the broad lan-
guage and clear legislative history of the Voting Rights Act. To minor-
ity citizens seeking equal opportunity in the election process, racially
discriminatory election procedures are no less harmful in judicial elec-
tions than in other elections.
There is no warrant for the exaggerated fears that are sometimes
expressed concerning the effect of judicial election lawsuits on the ad-
105. H.R. REP. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1981).
106. Irby v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 1357-59 (4th Cir. 1989) (long-
standing system of appointing school board members), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2589 (1990);
Williams v. State Bd. of Elections, 696 F. Supp. 1563, 1568-69 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (long-standing
system of appointment of associate judges).
107. Cf. Bunton v. Patterson, 393 U.S. at 569-70 (holding that Section 5 applied to a state's
shift from elective to appointive office because of the discriminatory potential of such a change).
108. This type of combined appointive and elective scheme is also known as the "Missouri
Plan." See generally Henry R. Glick, The Promise and Performance of the Missouri Plan: Judi-
cial Selection in the Fifty States, 32 U. MwIa L. REv. 509, 512 (1978).
109. A lawsuit challenging retention elections for judges is pending in Indiana. See Bradley
v. Indiana State Election Bd., No. IP91-898C (S.D. Ind. filed Aug. 9, 1991).
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ministration of justice. Remedial schemes that eliminate racially dis-
criminatory features of the election system will not interfere with any
legitimate state interest in the functioning of the judicial system. As
the report of the Florida Supreme Court's Racial and Ethnic Bias
Study Commission illustrates, the states themselves have a strong in-
terest in reforming election practices that operate to deny minorities
an effective voice in judicial elections. The protections of Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act can vindicate those interests by opening the ju-
dicial system to full participation by minority citizens.

